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We develop a model where workers may enter self-employment or search for jobs as 
employees and where there is heterogeneity across workers’ managerial ability.  Workers 
with higher skills will manage larger firms while workers with low managerial ability 
will run smaller firms and will be in self-employment only when they cannot find a 
salaried job. For these workers self-employment is a secondary/informal form of 
employment. The Burdett and Mortensen (1998) equilibrium search model is used for 
illustration as a special case of our more general framework. Empirical evidence from 
Mexico is provided and demonstrates that firm size wage effects for employees and self-
employed workers are broadly consistent with the model. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: J31, O17 





Many of the earlier empirical studies comparing the wages of formal and informal 
sector workers suggest that informal sector workers, even if equally productive, are 
typically paid less than their formal sector counterparts.
2  A number of explanations have 
been offered in this regard, mostly based on a segmented view of the labour market.
3  
However, more recently the evidence has been much more mixed. Cunningham and 
Maloney (2001) suggest that there may be an upper tier and lower tier of informal 
enterprises. Marcouiller, Ruiz and Woodruff (1997) find a wage premiums associated 
with informal work in Mexico but not in other countries while Günther and Launov 
(2011) find evidence of both competitive and segmented labour markets in the formal 
sector of Côte d'Ivoire.  In other instances the existence of a wage penalty may depend on 
gender (Tansel, 2000), the level of education (Gong and van Soest, 2002), both firm-size 
and unobserved ability (Falco et al (2011), firm size El Badaoui et al, 2010 - EB from 
now on – )  or on the point in the wage distribution (Tannuri Pianto and Pianto, 2002, and 
Bargain and Kwenda, 2011).  In other studies any payment differential can be entirely 
explained by unobserved heterogeneity (Pratap and Quintin, 2005). Considering the wide 
range of evidence overall, it is perhaps best to conclude that, if anything, there is a good 
deal of heterogeneity in the size of the informal premium/penalty and that for different 
groups of workers, as suggested by Fields (2007), the reality may be very diverse in that 
                                                 
1 The introduction and data description draw on El Badaoui, Strobl and Walsh (2009) and El Badaoui, 
Strobl and Walsh (2010) 
2 See, for example, Mazumdar (1981), Heckman and Hotz (1986), Roberts (1989), Pradhan and van Soest 
(1995), Tansel (1999), and Gong and van Soest (2002). 
3 For instance, the presence of barriers to entry into the formal sector could pose a possible cause, so that 
working in the informal sector is associated with a negative wage premium even for equally productive 
workers; see Fields (1975) and Mazumdar (1975). 2 
 
the desirability of informal sector employment in terms of remuneration depends on the 
segment of the labour market in question.  
In this paper we develop a model that captures this heterogeneity and look for 
empirical support using micro data from Mexico.  More specifically, we develop a model 
where self-employment arises as the most desirable outcome for workers with high 
managerial ability while the existence of search frictions means that self-employment 
emerges as a secondary, undesirable outcome for workers with low managerial ability.  
These low ability workers would prefer employment to self employment but are unable to 
find a job. As in EB informality is defined at the firm’s level, and the firm’s choice of 
whether to be formal or informal is endogenised.  While we model managerial ability and 
the flow of workers into self-employment, the distinctive feature of the model is that 
these self-employed managers create jobs in an environment with search frictions.  These 
frictions imply that salaried jobs may not be readily available, so that some workers who 
would prefer to be employed will enter self-employment, and also that wage dispersion 
will emerge among similar employees. A formal sector premium, which is identical to a 
firm size premium, emerges in equilibrium for employees. Self-employed managers of 
large formal firms also earn premiums, which are just a return to managerial ability.   
.    
Our main theoretical results are established in a general model where large firms 
are assumed to pay higher wages but the reason why is not specified. The Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998) equilibrium search model turns out to be a special case that we amend, 
for illustrative purpose, by incorporating taxes and a penalty for non-payment of taxes.  
In this example a firm size premium emerges endogenously and we can solve the model 3 
 
explicitly, illustrating the results.  As in the Lucas (1976) span of control framework, 
workers differ in their relative productivity in employment and self-employment 
(managing a firm).
4   
One should note that our theoretical model follows a growing body of literature that 
uses search models to analyse the informal sector.  For instance, Albrecht et al. (2009) 
extend the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model to incorporate a self-
employed informal sector where there is heterogeneity in workers’ productivity in that 
more productive workers may opt to wait for a formal sector job, while others may select 
into the informal sector. Ulyssea (2010) develops a matching model incorporating key 
institutional features of the Brazilian economy and conducts policy simulations.  Also, 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) develop a matching model with supervision where workers in 
the informal sector cannot avail of unemployment benefits, and show that matches found 
not paying tax are dissolved. Their model suggests that policies aimed at reducing the size 
of the shadow economy may increase unemployment. Alternatively, Fugazza and Jacques 
(2004) incorporate psychic costs as part of the costs of being in the informal economy in a 
matching model where workers direct their search at informal sector firms
5.   
Our model is also consistent with some of the empirical literature discussed earlier 
in that the informal wage penalty does appear to be limited to low wage/skill workers 
while firm size is an important determinant of the employee formal sector premium.  
Using information on firm size in a sample of employees and self-employed workers in 
Mexico we test the predictions of our model more directly.  In this regard we assume that 
                                                 
4 Rauch (1991) and Amaral and Quintin(2006) and Blau (1985) develop  models where workers with 
higher managerial ability select into self-employment in a developing country context.  There are no search 
frictions in these models. 
5 Bosch (2006) and Bosch and Maloney (2006) look at the effect of an informal sector on patterns of job 
creation and job destruction. 4 
 
if we observe a self-employed worker in a firm with more than one person in the firm this 
is an indicator of some managerial ability, while if we observe a large number of low-skill 
low-wage self-employed workers in one person firms, this is consistent with a residual 
sector where low-skill worker with low managerial ability remain in self-employment not 
by choice but because waged employment opportunities are rationed.  To provide 
evidence that low-skill self-employed workers in one-person firms are in a secondary 
sector we compare their wages with similar employed workers to see if there is a wage 
premium.  Indeed the evidence unearthed from the Mexican data generally supports the 
predictions of our model. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we present 
our theoretical model.  In Section III we outline the Burdett-Mortensen model as a 
specific example of our framework.  Empirical support for the predictions of our model is 
provided in Section IV.   Concluding remarks are given in the final section.   
 
II. The Model 
We will assume that worker types are ordered according to their productivity in 
self-employment.  That is type 0 has the lowest productivity parameter (p0),  type 1 the 
second lowest (p1) and so on up to the highest type z workers.   There is a mass  i L  of type 







 .  Workers can be 
unemployed, self-employed or in employment.  Since we shall focus on a stationary 
equilibrium we suppress the time subscripts to avoid clutter.  Employees and the self-
employed may be in formal or informal firms.  While each worker type differs in their 5 
 
productivity as a manager, all workers are equally productive as employees.
6  We will 
refer to firms managed by a type i worker as “type i firms” and firms with only the 
manager employed as “own-account firms” from now on.  There is free entry of firms, 
that is, any worker can choose to enter self-employment at any time.    
While there are different reasons for firms to choose whether to be formal or 
informal in the model we present here, formal sector firms pay tax and informal ones do 
not, but informal firms risk incurring the penalty associated with non-compliance.  
Smaller firms who are more costly to monitor are less likely to be caught and so more 
likely to be in the informal sector.  There are of course other reasons for being in the 
informal sector (see Era Dabla-Norris et al., 2006, for a more detailed discussion).  For 
example, it may be that certification is important for a self-employed professional or 
tradesman so that particular types of small firms such as doctors and lawyers etc. will be 
in the formal sector for this reason. Access to capital is also easier for formal firms, as 
seen in Amaral and Quentin (2005) and other studies. At the same time, it may be that an 
inefficient bureaucracy imposes costs on the formal sector so some firms will go 
informal.  Here we follow EB
7 and introduce a tax rate t on wage income that is paid by 
firms.  We start with a general model where there is a positive and continuous 
relationship between a firm’s employment n and the wage w, n(w), in a stationary 
equilibrium, but initially do not specify why this positive relationship exists.  Firms have 
                                                 
6 In reality of course there will be differences in workers productivity in employment and this may differ 
across formal  status.  In particular Albrecht et al (2009) outline a version of the Mortensen Pissarides 
matching model where it is assumed that workers have the same ability in self-employment but workers 
differ in skills which are used in employment.  Since skills are only useful in employment low skill workers 
prefer not to incur the cost of searching for employment in equilibrium and prefer self-employment even 
though this is a low wage sector. 
7 Much of the following passage is taken straight from EB who discuss the large literature that equates 
informality with small firms in more detail. Note that a fundamental difference with EB is that self-
employment was not modelled explicitly in this earlier contribution. 6 
 
the production function   i pq n  where pi is the productivity of the manager. We assume 
that  0 n qn  and   0 nn qn  .  There is a tax rate t on wages and a Poisson arrival rate of 
negative shocks,  , which will destroy the firm.  If the firm is destroyed the self-
employed manager can set up a new firm but the setup cost is a fraction  of the value of 
a firm to that manager.  The Poisson arrival rate of tax inspectors is a positive function of 
the number of employees at the firm,     w n  .  If firms are caught not paying their taxes 
they are punished and must pay a fine according to the function.     w wtn  , which is 
increasing in the per period tax bill   w wtn .   
The flow of profits in self-employment for a manager of type i managing a 
defaulting (d) or compliant (c) firm in a stationary equilibrium at any wage w are: 
 








pq n w w nw n w w t n w
pq n w w t n w


           
   
 (1) 
Defaulting firms pay the wage net of tax but incur a cost if they are caught defaulting, the 
probability of which depends on the number of workers, while compliant firms do not 
incur this cost but pay the tax.   
The flow value of the firm for defaulting or compliant self-employed managers is 
respectively. 
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The flow value of the firm, where r is the discount rate, is the dividend stream plus any 
capital gain/loss in the value of the firm.  The dividend stream is the flow of profits and 
the capital gain term comes from employment opportunities and from the arrival rate of 
negative shocks that destroy the firm.  The, for now, exogenously given job offer 
distribution is F(w).  This gives us the probability that any offer received has a wage w or 
less.  We make the simplifying assumption that the stream of job offers is the same for an 
employee, a self-employed worker or an unemployed worker.  All workers receive job 
offers at a Poisson arrival rate  . The gain associated with an employment offer with 
value E(w) is [() ]
j
i Ew V   where  (.) j dc  , or zero for offers worse than the current 
state.
8 We get the expected value of offers by integrating over the wage offer distribution.  
If a negative shock arrives the self-employed worker can either set up a new firm in self-
employment in which case they incur a sunk cost which is a fraction of the value of the 
firm, 
j
i V  , and incur a capital loss of this amount, or else enter unemployment which has 
a value Ui.  Entering unemployment from self-employment implies a loss of  ( )
j
ii VU .
9   
Unemployment has the flow value: 
                                                 
8 Since all workers have the same productivity in employment the value of a job offer does not depend on 
the workers type. 
9 It is worth noting at this stage that if we brought the stream of profits to one side where  (.) j dc   then:  
  () { m a x [ () ,() ] () } () m a x { () , [ () ] } ()
w
jj j j j j
ii i i i i i
w
rV w V w E x V w dF x V w V w U w           
 
Since the three terms on the left hand side are monotonically increasing in  ()
j
i Vw it must be that 
()
sign[ ] [ ]
j j




 .   
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  [max{ ( ), ( )} ] ( )
w
w
rU b E w E x U dF x      (3) 
The stream of benefits is b and the worker has the possibility of a capital gain if a job 
offer arrives.  Self-employment is preferred to unemployment if the expected value of 
self-employment net of the setup cost of a firm is better than the expected value of 
unemployment:  
 (1 ) max( , )
dc
ii VV U     (4) 
The flow value of employment in any job is: 
 
( ) [max{ ( ), ( )} ( )] ( )












  (5) 
This is the flow value of the wage plus the value of higher wage job offers times the 
arrival rate of such offers integrated over the job offer distribution, plus the arrival rate of 
negative shocks that lead to job loss times the capital loss from losing a job. The latter is 
the difference between the value of the current state and the maximum of the value of 
unemployment and the value of self-employment (net of the cost of setting up a firm).   
 
Proposition One:  
Higher productivity firms offer higher wages than lower productivity firms.
10 That is, if 
there are two firms managed by type i and k managers respectively where pi>pk , then 
ik ww   for all wages paid by type i and type k firms. 
Proof in Appendix 1 
 
                                                 
10 Burdett and Mortensen (1998)  p268. Show this to be true in their model which we will use as an 
example later.  9 
 
We assume that there is a stationary equilibrium where there is a continuous positive 
relationship between the number of employees and the wage rate n(w).  We will denote 
the tax bill as   w wtn B   for shorthand.   
 
Proposition Two:  If the elasticity of punishment with respect to the tax bill is greater 







 , and there are some compliant and some non-
compliant firms of a given type in equilibrium, then there will be a cut-off point in firm 
size below which all firms will default on their taxes, and above which firms will be 
compliant.  In other words, we will have a wage distribution with small low-wage firms 
in the informal sector and large high-wage firms in the formal sector. 
Proof in Appendix 1 
 
Propositions One and Two establish that higher productivity firms pay higher wages and 
that there will be a cut-off point for firm size and the wage above which firms will choose 
to be compliant.  Large, high-wage firms will be compliant and small, low-wage firms 
will be non-compliant.  This was also the case in EB where there was no difference in 
productivity across firms and where self-employment was not modelled explicitly.  We 
will denote the lowest and highest wage paid by each firm type in equilibrium 
respectively as  i w  and i w . 
 
Proposition Three:  
Workers with the lowest managerial ability would prefer any job to self-employment.  




Proposition Three shows that workers with the lowest managerial ability will be 
in a secondary informal sector in the sense that any job would be better than their current 
state.  If unemployment benefits are sufficiently low (4) will hold for the lowest ability 
group and this group will prefer self-employment to unemployment. But if benefits are 
sufficiently high (4) will not hold and this group will choose unemployment over self-
employment. 
Next we assume that an own-account worker has labour supply n
o so that output 
for an own-account worker of type i is piq(n
o).  If income of own-account workers is 
liable for tax and the assumptions of Proposition Two hold, own-account firms will be 
non-compliant since they are the smallest firms.  Of course any self-employed worker can 
choose to be either a manager or an own-account worker.  For simplicity we assume that 
the only tax is a payroll tax, so that profits are not taxed.  This means that own-account 
firms do not pay tax and have a profit stream: 
  00 () ()
d
ii np n    (6) 
 
Proposition Four:  
As long as some firms are larger than own-account firms, the highest ability managers 
will prefer self-employment to any employment offer. 
Proof in Appendix 1 
 
While Proposition Three established that workers with the lowest managerial ability 
would prefer any job to self-employment, Proposition Four establishes that there will be 
a group of workers (those with the highest managerial ability) who prefer self-
employment to any job offer.  We note that this implies that if there are more than two 11 
 
ability groups we will have a lot of heterogeneity across the pool of self-employed 
workers.  In particular there will be a low ability group who would prefer any job to self-
employment, a high ability group who would not accept any job and possibly an 
intermediate ability groups who (given that there are good and bad job offers) would 
accept some jobs but not others. 
 
III.  The Burdett Mortensen model as an example 
Below we summarise labour market flows and then derive the equilibrium labour 
supply curve and wage offer distribution using the equilibrium search model outlined in 
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) [BM from now on] .  This model serves as an example 
where a positive relationship between firm size and wages emerges endogenously in 
equilibrium and where we can solve the model explicitly.  We begin by deriving the 
labour supply curve in a model where there are search frictions and workers receive on 
the job offers.
 11  We define  i m  as the mass of type i self-employed workers who employ 
others and  i s as the mass of type i self-employed own-account workers.  This means that 
a mass of  ii i i msu L  type  i workers are in self-employment, where ui  is the self-
employment rate for type i workers.  There is random matching so that any job offer is 
equally likely to come from any firm irrespective of the firm’s size.
12 The distribution of 
wage offers which we will solve for is   F w .  BM assume  0 r   in their derivation of the 
labour supply curve and we follow this assumption. The other assumptions and parameter 
definitions from the previous section continue to hold.  For simplicity we will assume 
                                                 
11 See Mortensen (2003) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for a detailed derivation of the labour supply 
curve.   
12 See Manning (2003) pp. 284-286 for a discussion on the matching technology. 12 
 
that unemployment benefits are low enough so that the lowest ability group choose to be 
in self-employment and thus there will be no unemployed workers in equilibrium.
13  In 
particular this means that (1 )max( , )
dc
ii VV U   for all worker types.  Self-employed 
workers incur the cost of setting up a firm when they lose a job or when their existing 
firm receives a negative shock.  Since this cost is sunk, any job offer with a wage higher 
than self-employment profits would be accepted by this worker.  In a stationary 
equilibrium inflows and outflows to self-employment of each worker type are equal, 
implying the following relationship between inflows and outflows from self-












The share of wage offers which fall below the self-employment profit a type i worker can 
earn is () i F  . If    i Nw  is aggregate employment of type i workers at wage w or less, 
stationarity ensures that the outflows (the separation rate plus the flow of job offers 
received from higher wage firms, times the stock) and inflows (the number of offers less 
than w accepted by self-employed workers of this type) to this stock are equal, i.e.: 
 
.
{[ 1 ( ) ] } ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] 0 ii i i i NF w N w F w F u L          (8) 
We can solve for employment of type i workers earning w or less, which is the 
employment rate for this group, 1 i u  , times the wage distribution of this group,  () i Gw, 
times the population of workers of this type,  i L : 
                                                 
13 This assumption fits well with the stylized facts in countries like Mexico, as discussed in the next section, 
but less so with countries (South Africa for example) where unemployment benefits exist together with 


















Solving for  () i Gw 
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 .  Each worker can expect to receive 
M
 offers at each 
point in time from each firm
14.  A fraction  i u of the population of type i workers will be 
self-employed and will accept all wage offers they receive from firms offering w, as long 
as w is greater than their reservation wage.
15 Also a fraction 1 i u   of type i workers are in 
employment and  () i Gwof them earn no more than w. These workers will accept offers of 
w and also represent an inflow to a firm paying a wage w.
16   The separation rate at any 
firm for any worker type:    dwis the sum of the job destruction rate δ plus the arrival 
rate of offers to each worker times the probability the offer comes from a higher wage 
firm:   1 Fw     : 
      1 dw Fw        (12) 
                                                 
14 Because of random matching each offer is equally likely to come from any firm. 
15 We note that since a worker of type i can always earn pi as an own-account worker their reservation wage 
must be greater than or equal to pi. 
16 The remaining   () ( 1 ) ii i LH G w u    offers will be received by workers who already earn more than w 
and would be rejected.   14 
 
The separation rate times employment equals inflows per firm in a stationary equilibrium, 
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Equation (13) gives the labour supply of type i workers to a firm paying a wage w.  To 
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The equilibrium wage distribution 
We assume that there are three worker types: 0, 1 and 2 where as before a higher number 
indicates higher managerial ability.  We assume output increases at a constant rate with 
additional workers and that own-account labour supply equals unity:  0 1 n  .  That is the 
profitability of an own-account worker is: 
  () io i np    (15) 
The production function for a self-employed worker hiring others is: 
  [, ] ii i qpn p n   (16) 
We assume that the sunk cost of becoming an own-account worker is the same fraction of 
profits  as the cost of becoming an employer.  15 
 
 To solve the model explicitly we follow EB and assume the Poisson arrival rate 
of tax inspectors is a constant μ times employment to the power of a constant  so that 
large firms are more likely to be caught defaulting:   [() ] nw nw
   . We specify the 
penalty for defaulting as x times the firm’s per period tax bill:    []( ) wtn w xwtn w . To 
save on notation we define sx    as the parameter that when multiplied by employment 
to the power of  1     determines the expected punishment for defaulters at any point 
in time.  In this case from (2) 
dc





    (17) 
We can use the expression for labor supply (14) in (17) to calculate the cut-off value of 










  (18) 
Appendix 2 spells out the detail on how we solve the model explicitly.  Clearly the form 
of the equilibrium distribution depends on the parameter assumptions. We assume a set of 
values on the tax and punishment parameters such that some firms are compliant and 
others non-compliant in equilibrium.  The equilibrium wage offer distribution is shown in 
Figure 1 where we differentiate the offers made by different types of employers.  The 
parameter values assumed in Figure 1 are given in Table 4 of Appendix 3.     We see in 
Figure 1. that the distribution is continuous over two regions with a jump at the wage 
where firms choose to be compliant.  The high ability employers offer higher wages than 
the intermediate ability employers in line with Proposition One.  The smallest firms 
                                                 
17 It is worth noting that even with a general production function y=y(n), where y is output, equation (17) 
and (18) will hold. 16 
 
managed by intermediate ability employers are non-compliant and higher wage firms 
with employment levels greater than implied by (17) are compliant in line with 
Proposition Two.  We note from Figure 1 that the lowest ability workers will never hire 
others in equilibrium and will accept any job offer in line with Proposition Three. As we 
would expect from Proposition Four the highest ability group are all self-employed. 
 
IV. Empirical Evidence 
Our theoretical model suggests a number of hypothesis  which  we can seek to test 
empirically.  More precisely, small firms will be informal and large firms formal. 
Additionally, both employees and the self-employed will earn a firm size wage premium 
which will reflect ability for the self-employed but rents for employees.  The model also 
predicts that self-employed workers in the smallest firms will be the residual category and 
thus should have lower wages than all others.   
The data comes from the Mexican National Occupation and Employment Survey 
(ENOE) conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geographica  Informatica 
(INEGI). This is a quarterly survey where workers are observed at most five times over a 
five-quarter period. We use data from the second quarter 2005 to the third quarter 2008.  
We restrict our sample to urban men aged 15 to 65 years, not engaged in any form of 
education, and in full time employment in the private sector. We focus on men to avoid 
any selection issues associated with differences in participation rates in employment and 
self-employment.  We include only private sector workers, which excludes unpaid family 
workers and public sector employees for similar reasons. 17 
 
The question we have for earnings in the questionnaire is “what are the earnings 
from main occupation?” and the payment periods are provided  as monthly, every 
15days, every week, per day and other payment period. These are used to convert all 
incomes to calculate a weekly gross wage for the primary job.  Usual weekly hours are 
used as a control variable in the analysis.  It would be desirable to distinguish between 
wages and profits for the self-employed workers – the information on monthly earnings 
does not allow this distinction hence in this paper we are comparing self-employment 
income to formal sector wages on the basis of weekly earnings. 
Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented in Tables S1 
and S2 in Appendix 3, for the full sample and by self- employment / employee status.  
This also gives us the proportion of workers in each firm size category by formal vs. 
informal and self-employment vs. employee categories.  The self-employed are older 
(41.9 years compared to 33.7), less likely to be single (11% compared to 26%) and work 
fewer hours per week  (47.8 compared to 50.4).   While there is little difference in years 
of education (7.33 and 8 years respectively), we note from Table S3 that when we look at 
average years education by self-employment vs. employee and by firm size that there is a 
noticeable increase in years as firm size category increases, particularly for the self-
employed.
18 This indicates that the assumption that higher ability workers manage larger 
firms may be reasonable. 
                                                 
18 Table S3 shows a less pronounced but nevertheless a clear increase for employees.  To make the model 
tractable the theoretical model assumes skills used in employment are equal across workers , this 
assumption means the model  makes no meaningful prediction on the equilibrium relationship between firm 
size and ability for employees. 18 
 
   Table 1 shows the results of a probit regression (clustered by individuals) on 
informal status controlling for a large number of other factors.
19  There are two separate 
regressions, the first column for self-employed workers and the second for workers who 
are employees.  The excluded category is firms with one worker for the self-employed 
and firms with 2-5 employees for employees (note that workers in a firm with only one 
employee must be self-employed so there are no employees in firms with one worker).  
Within both groups the reported coefficient which is the marginal probability of being 
informal is negative for all groups and typically falls substantially as firm size increases.  
The exception is that the probability of being informal for self-employed workers in firms 
with 11-15 workers is 2.7%  lower than own-account workers while it is only 1.1% lower 
for self-employed workers in firms with 11-15 workers. However, when we move to 
firms greater than 51 workers the probability of being informal is 13.5% lower than for 
own-account workers.  Overall there seems to be strong support for the prediction that 
larger firms are more likely to be formal.  This is consistent with Proposition Two. 
Table 2 provides the results from regressions with the log weekly wage as the 
dependent variable.  The regression in the first column of Table 2 includes dummies for 
formal employees, formal self-employed workers and informal employees.  That is 
informal self-employed are the excluded category.  As can be seen, in Mexico the self-
employed earn wage premia relative to employees. In particular self-employed informal 
workers earn 21.8% more than informal employees and 4% more than formal employees.  
For both employees and the self-employed, earnings are higher than for their informal 
sector counterparts.  Formal self-employed workers earn 11.3% more than informal self-
                                                 
19 In all regressions we include wave dummies, years of education and its squared value, age and its 
squared value, gender, marital status dummies, and one digit industry and occupation dummies. 19 
 
employed workers.  This basic formulation is consistent with the evidence from the 
literature in Maloney (2004) or Marcouiller, Ruiz and Woodruff (1997) that self-
employed workers are not in a secondary sector. 
The second column in Table 2 allows for the fact that firm size will act as a proxy 
for the formal premium if large firms are typically formal because of the fear of being 
caught.  Higher wages for workers in larger firms are do not reflect the skill of the worker 
or a compensating differential for any other aspect of the job that is controlled for and are 
interpreted as rents.  Firm size dummies for self-employed workers on the other hand are 
interpreted as returns to managerial ability.  That is if there is a positive and increasing 
coefficient as we move to larger firms we interpret this as an indication that higher skilled 
managers run larger businesses and are paid more.  There are six firm size categories 
(Own-account firms, 2-5,  6-10, 11-15, 16-50 and > 50).  We exclude observations where 
firm size could not be established in all of the regressions. We see in the second column 
of Table 2 that in line with the assumptions underlying the model, wages increase 
progressively for employees as they move into larger firms and the same is true for self-
employed workers. Employees in all firm size categories (except the smallest firms) are 
better off than self-employed in the smallest firms.  This stands in contrast to the results 
in the first column where self-employment emerges as the high wage sectors.  When we 
interact with firm size self-employment is often only a high wage sector for those who 
employ others and this premium increases as the size of the firm managed increases. 
Table 2 presents the results across firm size categories without controlling 
explicitly for formal/informal status.  While this is in line with the theoretical model, as 
we noted earlier there are other plausible models of informality that do not imply that 20 
 
small firms will always be informal.  In addition we only look at gross wages while EB 
show that differentiating between net and gross wage for formal and informal workers is 
an important factor in explaining the formal sector wage premium.  Given these 
arguments Table 3 presents log weekly wage regressions for firm size categories by self-
employment/employment status and formal/informal status.  The excluded category is 
own-account (one worker in the firm) informal self-employed workers. We will discuss 
the coefficients for self-employed workers initially.  We note that for both formal and 
informal self-employed workers the coefficient on firm size is always positive, 
statistically significant and increasing with firm size.  We also note that the coefficient on 
formal self-employed is always larger than for informal self-employed within each firm 
size category indicating that there is a formal premium for self-employed workers.  As 
noted above this may be because firm size does not capture the effect of informality fully 
or simply the fact that we are looking at gross wages and formal workers would have a 
higher gross wage in equilibrium since the expected wage/profit (net of taxes for formal 
workers or penalties if caught defaulting for informal) are equal for formal and informal 
self-employed workers in equilibrium. 
When we look at the firm size coefficients for employees, we see that while they 
are much smaller than for self-employed workers, they are always positive for formal 
employees and, with the exception of the smallest firm size category, statistically 
significant and increasing with firm size.  That is formal sector employees who from the 
summary statistics in Appendix 3 account for just over 40% of all workers are always 
better off than own-account self-employed workers and the size of this affect increases 
with firm size.  The picture is less clear for informal employees.  Employees in firms with 21 
 
less than ten workers earn about 17% less than own-account self-employed workers.  
From the summary statistics we see that informal employees account for about 31% of all 
workers and about 27% of this total is accounted for by employees in firms with less than 
ten workers.  Informal employees in larger firms do earn premiums that increase with 
firm size relative to own-account self-employed workers. 
We can summarise how consistent the results described above are with the four 
propositions from the theoretical section.  Proposition One says that more productive 
firms will pay more.  The results described above are consistent with this.  Managers of 
larger firms do have higher measured ability and larger firms pay more.  Proposition Two 
predicts a wage distribution with small low wage informal firms and large formal high 
wage firms.  Once again most of the evidence is consistent with this, Table 1 provides 
strong evidence of a positive relationship between firm-size and formality while results 
from the wage regressions in Tables 2 and 3 show that larger firms pay more.  
Proposition Three suggests that workers with the lowest managerial ability will prefer 
any job to self-employment.  If we accept that managers of the smallest firms are the 
lowest ability group of managers then the evidence from Table 3 suggests that self-
employed own account managers (who are the excluded category in the regression in 
Tale 3) would earn more in a job in a large informal firm or any formal firm.  There are a 
substantial number of workers in small informal firms who earn less than the own 
account self-employed workers and this is not consistent with Proposition Three.  That is 
while there is convincing evidence that low skilled managers would earn higher wages in 
many jobs, this is not true for jobs in small informal firms.  Proposition Four suggests 
that the highest ability managers (those managing the largest firms) prefer their current 22 
 
state to any possible job offer.  The regression results in Table 3 strongly support this 
proposition, self-employed managers of larger firms earn large premiums relative to all 
other workers and this premium is highest in the largest firms. 
 
V. Conclusion  
To the best of our knowledge the model of the formal/informal sector we outline here is 
the first to combine heterogeneity in managerial ability with search frictions in the labour 
market, allowing for a richer set of outcomes where self-employment may be desirable or 
an undesirable but unavoidable state for different workers.  Arguably this is an important 
contribution given the growing body of empirical evidence discussed in the introduction 
which shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in outcomes within the 
formal/informal sectors. 
The model has clear empirical predictions which as discussed in the previous 
section are broadly supported by the data, namely firm size premiums for both employees 
and the self-employed and that small scale self-employed informal workers are stuck in 
an undesirable state while intermediate or larger scale managers are self-employed by 
choice rather than necessity.  We note though that in contrast to the predictions of the 
model there are a substantial group of employees in small informal firms who earn less 
than self-employed own-account workers. 
We acknowledge that firm size is unlikely to be the only determinant of 
informality or a perfect predictor of managerial ability for the self-employed but as the 
literature shows, it is a key predictor of these variables and the empirical evidence 
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Appendix 1: Proof of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition One:   
From (2) a firm will maximize the value of the firm by maximizing the stream of profits. 
In equilibrium if a type i manager pays a wage wi and a type k manager a wage wk.  We 26 
 
assume that  j1….j4 in (19) below are all either equal to d or c, denoting whether the firm 
is compliant or defaulting: 
 
12 3 4 [ , ,( ) ] [ , ,( ) ] [ , ,( ) ] [ , ,( ) ]
jj j j
i i ii i i kk k k kk k k ii p wn w pwn w pwn w pwn w      (19) 
We define
1 j
i   as the level of profit for the optimal choice of wage and c or d of a type i 
firm and 
3 j
k   as the optimal choice for a type k firm
20.  The first inequality in (19) will 
hold irrespective of whether j2 equals j1 or not since the firm can do no better than the 
optimal choice.  Given this we set j2 equal to j3 which ensures that given that we assume 
that: pi>pk, the second inequality will hold.    Since 
3[,, () ]
j
kk k k p wn w   is the level of 
profit for an optimal choice of wage for this firm type, the third inequality will hold 
irrespective of whether j4 equals j3 or not.  Given this we set j4 equal to j1.  We can 
rearrange (19) as follows: 
 
14 2 3 [ , ,( ) ] [ , ,( ) ] [ , ,( ) ] [ , ,( ) ]
jj j j
ii i i kk i i ii k k kk k k p wn w p wn w pwn w p wn w     (20) 
Since j1=j4 and j2=j3 equations (2) imply that (20) can be rewritten as: 
  ( )[( ) ] ( )[( ) ] ik i ik k pp y n w pp y n w   (21) 
  This implies that  () () ii nw nw  which implies that  ik ww   □ 
 
Proof of Proposition Two: 
 Say w2>w1 where w1 and w2 are both wages offered by type i and type j firms 
respectively in equilibrium and  ji p p  .  That is firm j is either a firm of the same type as 
firm i or one managed by a higher ability manager.  We note that if w1 is the wage paid 
by the lowest wage compliant firm across all firms:  
                                                 
20 So for example if it is optimal for a type i firm to be compliant  then j1=c if it is optimal for a type k firm 
to default on taxes then j3=d. 27 
 
  11 () ()
cd
ii Vw Vw   (22) 
 Equation (22) just ensures that complying is more profitable for this firm.  First we show 
that (22) implies a higher profit stream for the compliant firm paying w1.   We note that 
the lowest wage compliant firm must have productivity that is at least as low as any other 
compliant firm, since from Proposition One higher productivity firms pay weakly higher 
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Since (22) holds it must be true that: 





VwE x Vwd F x VwE x Vwd F x    (24) 
This is so since (22) implies that there will be a range of values for w where: 
1 () ] ( ) 0
d
i Ex V w  but  11 m a x [() ,( ) ] ()0
cc
ii VwE x Vw     For wages less lower than in this 
range both terms are zero while for wages higher than in this range fro (22).  Also from 
(22):   
  11 11 max{[ ( ),[ ( ) ]} max{ ( ),[ ( ) ]} 0
cc dd
ii ii Vw Vw U Vw Vw U        (25) 
.  
 Inequalities (24) and (25) imply from (23) that if (22) holds : 
  11 () ()0
cd
ii ww     (26) 28 
 
 Next given that firm i is compliant we explore the possibility that a firm of type j (which 
has weakly higher productivity) and pays the higher wage w2, could be at least as well off 
being non-compliant rather than defaulting.  That is we explore the possibility that: 
  22 () ()
cd
jj Vw Vw   (27) 
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If (27) holds the right hand side of (28) must be weakly positive and we can say that: 
  22 () ()0
dc
jj ww     (29) 
Next we will show that given w2>w1 , then if the elasticity of punishment with respect to 
the tax bill is greater than or equal to unity: (27) cannot hold, that is it must be that: 
  22 () ()
cd
ii Vw Vw   (30) 
That is we show that if complying is optimal at the lowest wage complying firm, it must 
be optimal at any arbitrarily chosen higher wage firm.  To see this we note that 
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by assumption a sufficient condition for (31) to be 
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and the profitability of being compliant is 
increasing faster than the profitability of being non-compliant.  This means  (27) cannot 
hold.   Finally we note that if firm type j is a higher productivity type than firm type we 
can replace i with j in the derivative in equation (31) and the analysis above showing the 
derivative is positive still holds □ 
 
Proof of Proposition Three: 
 The value of the lowest equilibrium wage offer is: () E w .  Say this wage is offered by type 
j firm in equilibrium where  j i  and where i is the lowest ability type.   If a type i worker 
preferred self-employment to this offer then:   
  [ , , ( )] ( )    where   h ( , )
h
ii Vp w n w E w c d   (33) 30 
 
But since for any other worker type ki  it must be that  ki p p  in which case it follows 
from the definition of profits and the value of the firm (1) and (2) that 
[ ,,() ] [ ,,() ] ()  
hh
kk i k Vp w n w Vp w n w E w  .  That is it must be that if type i workers would 
prefer self-employment to the lowest wage job, the same would be true for all workers.  
This means that no firm could offer such a contract and attract any workers and such an 
offer cannot be an equilibrium contract.  It must be that in equilibrium the lowest wage 
contract is sufficiently attractive to attract at least the lowest ability worker or else it 
cannot attract any workers. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition Four: 
 From Proposition One the highest ability managers (we can call these group z) will 
manage the largest, highest wage firm.  Since any manager can choose to be an own-
account firm at any point in time, the profit of being the highest wage manager must be at 
least as high as the profit of being an own-account worker in equilibrium: 
  0 () ( )
j
zz wp q n    (34) 
Where  (, ) j cd  .    Since this is the largest firm and since   0 n qn  and   0 nn qn  by 
assumption and     
o
t nw n  by assumption, the additional output generated by the last 
o n workers in the highest wage firm is less than the high ability manager could produce 
as an own-account worker: 
     {}
oo
zt t z p qnw qnw n p qn              (35) 
 That is even if the highest wage firm paid a wage to the marginal worker equal to the 
value of their marginal product , from (35) this would be less than the workers earnings 31 
 
in self-employment (if the worker is from the highest ability group).  In fact of course the 
firm will also incur either an additional tax liability if it is compliant or an increase in 
the likelihood of a penalty if it is defaulting.  It follows that the highest wage firm could 




Appendix 2: Solving the equilibrium wage distribution 
Type 0 and type 1 workers 
All type 0 self-employed workers will be own-account workers since they cannot 
profitably hire another worker.  This is immediately clear from (15) and (16) where the 
value of marginal product of a type 1 worker in a type 0 firm is less than the value of a 
type 1 workers output in self-employment.  Using a similar argument a type 2 worker 
could never be profitably employed in a type 1 firm so that type 1 employers can only 
profitably hire type 0 workers.  







from (14).  We 
will assume that there are some non-compliant employers in equilibrium which implies 
from Proposition Two that the lowest wage type 1 employers are non-compliant.  From 
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This is Condition 1.    To focus on an equilibrium where there are some compliant firms 
amounts to assuming that F
*<1 in equation (18). This is Condition 2.  Combining (36) 












  If some type 1 self-employed workers hire other workers the lowest wage they will offer 
is the reservation wage of type 0 workers p0: 
  0 wp   (38) 
If the lowest wage firm were paying a wage  














This firm can cut the wage to  0 p and have the same labour supply but higher profit.  This 
is because the lowest wage firm attracts no workers from other firms and will lose 
workers to any firm that offers their workers a job.  The only workers the lowest wage 
firm attracts are self-employed type 0 workers who have received no better offer.  The 
lowest wage firm gains no advantage from offering these workers more than their 
reservation wage.  Free entry ensures that all type 1 firms must make the same profit in 
self-employment, that is if one firm is earning a higher profit than another the lower 
profit firm can imitate the higher profit firm so that their cannot be an equilibrium with 
differences in profit between the same firm type.  The stream of profit for an own-
                                                 






which must be true. 33 
 
account type 1 firm is: p1.  From (1) and (39) the condition that the profit of the lowest 
wage type 1 employer is equals that of an own-account worker in equilibrium is: 
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From equation (40) we can solve for the equilibrium value of M the mass of 
employers. Next we would like to solve for the mass of type 1 workers who are 
employers in equilibrium.  Given random matching, that no type 0 workers make offers  
and the fact that all offers by type 1 employers must be less than those by type 2 
employers from Proposition One, the percentage of offers made by type 1 employers is 
the mass of type 1 employers divided by the total mass of employers and this is the value 







  (41) 
The mass of firms equals the mass of type 1 and type 2 employers.  We will assume that 
all type 2 self-employed workers employ others (we know that type 2 workers are all self-
employed from Proposition Four but we will assume we are in an equilibrium where it is 
more profitable to be an employer rather than an own-account type 2 worker).  This 
assumption is enforced by parameter restrictions which we call Condition 3 and these 
restrictions are discussed later.  If type 2 workers are employers then: 
  121 2 M mm mL    (42) 34 
 









  (43) 
We will assume an equilibrium that some type 1 employers are non-compliant and some 
higher wage type 1 employers are compliant.  This is Condition 4 and amounts to the 
assumption that 
*
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The profit of all type 1 employers and own-account workers must be equal in equilibrium 
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From (41) and using the value of M that solves (40) we can solve for the wage in terms of 
the wage offer distribution over the range of offers made by type 1 firms:  1 0 (,) pw
23: 
                                                 
22 We note here that we must choose parameter values such that  2 LM  to ensure that this is positive.  
We also note that we must ensure that the fraction of type two workers who are self employed is greater 
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 Type 2 workers 
It follows from Proposition Four that type 2 workers (the highest ability group will all be 
self-employed.  As discussed above firms only hire workers with less ability than their 
manager, so type 2 employers could hire type 0 or type 1 workers in equilibrium.  We will 
impose parameter values such that all type 2 employers offer a wage high enough to 
attract both type 0 and type 1 workers in equilibrium.  This is called: Condition 5.  We 
will discuss what this restriction implies below.  The lowest wage that a type 2 employer 
will offer in an equilibrium where all type 2 employers offer wages that attract type 1 
workers is: 
  2 1 wp   (48) 
It can never make sense for the lowest wage type 2 employer to offer more than the 
reservation wage of type 1 workers, which is the profit a type 1 worker can earn in self-
employment as given by (40) above.  If the lowest wage type 2 firm were paying a wage 
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Since if they are the lowest wage type 2 employer that attracts type 1 workers, the wage 
must be no higher than the reservation wage of type 1 workers since the lowest wage firm 
will not attract any additional workers by offering more than this.  The profit of the 
lowest wage type 2 firm that hires both worker types is in turn: 
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Since there can be no mass points on the wage offer distribution we can 
set 1 1 () () F pF w 
24.  In equilibrium we will see that the wage offer distribution will be 
continuous over the range  1 0 (,) pwfor offers by type 1 employers.  There will be a 
discontinuity at  1 w to the lowest wage a type 2 employer offers which is p1.  We know 
that  1 p must be greater than 1 w since no type 1 employer could profitably pay a wage of p1.  
The higher part of the wage offer distribution comprising offers by type 2 employers will 
be continuous over the range:  2 1 (, ) pw . 
To establish that type 2 employers will not deviate to hiring only type 0 workers 
(Condition 3 holds) we must show that when a type 2 firm chooses any wage between the 
lowest ( 0 p ) and highest ( 1 w ) wage offered by type 1 firms that they would make less 
profit than they would in (50) which is the profit of a type 2 employer hiring both worker 
types.  To check this we insert type 2 productivity and the highest type 1 wage given in 
(47) into (46) the profit of a type 1 employer: 
 
                                                 
24 As in BM there can be no mass points on the equilibrium wage offer distribution since if there were a 
firm offering a wage slightly above the wage where there is a mass point will get higher profit than firms at 
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The highest wage type 2 employer offers the highest wage  2 ()1 Fw  and from (14) 
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    (52) 
Since all type 2 employers must make equal profit we can solve for the highest wage 














 The wage offer distribution for type 2 employers who offer wages between p1 and wcan 
be solved by equating profit of type 2 firms in this range with 1 () p  : 
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  To illustrate the model we proceed by assuming parameter values and solving a 
numerical value.  We assume that  1   so that  2   .  That is we assume a linear 
relationship between firm size and the arrival rate of tax inspectors.  This ensures that the 
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Table S1: Summary Statistics and number of observations by Firm Size, 
Employment & Formal categories 
 
Variable name     All Self-employed  Employees 
   Mean  s.d.  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Log  weekly  wage    #  6.69 0.58 6.77 0.73 6.66  0.5 
Sector  interacted  with  Firm  size:        
Self-employed formal  1  3,489  0.01 0.1 0.04  0.19     
  2-5  2,606 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.16     
  6-10  199  0 0.02 0 0.05     
  11-15  55  0 0.01 0 0.02     
  16-50  25  0 0.01 0 0.02     
  >50  18  0 0.01 0 0.01     
Self-employed informal  1 52,496  0.15 0.36 0.55  0.5     
 2-5  34,409  0.1  0.3  0.36  0.48     
  6-10  1,916 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.14     
  11-15  431  0 0.04 0 0.07     
  16-50  264  0 0.03 0 0.05     
  >50  53  0 0.01 0 0.02     
Employed formal  2-5  18,409  0.05  0.22    0.07  0.26 
  6-10  15,301  0.04  0.21    0.06  0.24 
  11-15  9,398  0.03  0.16    0.04  0.19 
  16-50  32,817  0.1  0.29    0.13  0.34 
  >50  62,851  0.18  0.39    0.25  0.43 
Employed informal  2-5  75,868  0.22  0.41    0.31  0.46 
  6-10  16,444  0.05  0.21    0.07  0.25 
  11-15  5,030  0.01  0.12    0.02  0.14 
  16-50  8,769  0.03  0.16    0.04  0.18 
 >50  3,579  0.01  0.1      0.01  0.12 
          
Formal  self-employed   6,392 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.25     
Informal self-employed    89,569  0.26 0.44 0.93  0.25     
Formal employees    138,776 0.4  0.49    0.56  0.50 




Table S2: Summary statistics by firm size, employment/self/employment and formal 
categories
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Log weekly wage 6.69 0.58 6.77 0.73 6.66 0.5
Years of education 7.81 3.22 7.33 3.5 8 3.09
Age 35.97 11.96 41.9 11.06 33.68 11.5
Hours per week 49.71 14.71 47.81 18 50.44 13.15
Single 0.22 0.41 0.11 0.31 0.26 0.44
Married 0.58 0.49 0.66 0.47 0.54 0.5
Marital status other 0.2 0.4 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.4
Industry
Mining 0.01 0.09 0 0.04 0.01 0.1
Manufacturing 0.24 0.43 0.14 0.35 0.28 0.45
Construction 0.22 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.2 0.4
Trade 0.2 0.4 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.4
Hospitality 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Trans & Comm 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32
Finance & corporate 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.2 0.05 0.21
Social services 0 0.07 0 0.05 0.01 0.07
Miscellaneous 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.08 0.28
Occupation
Prof. & technicians 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.17
Education workers 0 0.04 0 0.04 0 0.04
Officers & directors 0.01 0.1 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.08
Clerks 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.25
Indus & craft workers 0.51 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.51 0.5
Dealers 0.16 0.37 0.25 0.43 0.13 0.33
Trade operators 0.13 0.34 0.1 0.3 0.14 0.35
Prof-personal services 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.26 0.08 0.28
Security 0.02 0.15 0 0.03 0.03 0.17
Agric 0 0.04 0 0.05 0 0.04
Town size
>100 000 0.65 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.65 0.48
15000-99999 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.34
2500-14999 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31








Table S3: Years of education by Self-employment/Employee and firm size 
 
 
  Self-employed Employees 
 
Firm Size 1  7.13 --- 
Firm Size 2-5  7.51 7.38 
Firm Size 6-10  8.63 7.76 
Firm Size 11-15  9.21 8.12 
Firm Size 16-50  9.83 8.25 





Table 1: Probability of being Informal 
 










 (7.55)**   
 





 (11.13)**  (76.56)** 
 





 (7.56)**  (86.92)** 
 





 (3.38)**  (146.01)** 
 














Notes: (i) Reported coefficients are marginal probabilities; (ii) Standard errors are clustered by 
individuals. (iii) ** and * indicate 1% and 5 % significance levels, respectively; (iv) Controls for 
sample wave, years education, years education squared, age, age squared, two marital status and one 
digit industry and occupation dummies and an indicator for town size are also included.  (v) The 
excluded categories are the sample wave dummy for quarter two 2005, marital status is single, 
occupation is Professional and Technical, industry is Mining, town size is greater than 100,000 and 
firm-size = 1 for the results in the first column and firm-size between 2-5 for the second column. 
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Table 2: Log Weekly Wage Regressions: Coefficients on Firm Size Employee/Self-
employed Interactions 
 






 (61.54)**   
Formal employees  -0.039   
 (10.15)**   
Formal self-employed  0.113   
 (11.97)**   
Fs2-5 × employed   -0.131 
   (33.67)** 
Fs6-10 × employed   0.015 
   (3.29)** 
Fs11-15 × employed   0.046 
   (8.46)** 
Fs16-50 × employed   0.076 
   (16.75)** 
Fs>50 × employed   0.105 
   (22.96)** 
Fs2-5 × self-employed   0.244 
   (47.11)** 
Fs6-10 × self-employed   0.605 
   (32.04)** 
Fs11-15 × self-employed   0.683 
   (18.01)** 
Fs16-50 × self-employed   0.935 
   (16.60)** 
Fs>50 × self-employed   1.370 







R-squared 0.23  0.25 
 
 
Notes: (i) Robust Standard errors are clustered by individuals; (ii) ** and * indicate 1% and 5 % 
significance levels, respectively; (iii) Controls for sample wave, years education, years education 
squared, age, age squared, two marital status and one digit industry and occupation dummies and an 
indicator for town size are also included.  (iv)The excluded categories are the sample wave dummy 
for quarter two 2005, marital status is single, occupation is Professional and Technical, industry is 
Mining, town size is greater than 100,000 and informal self-employed for the results in the first 







Table 3: Log Weekly Wage Regressions: Coefficients on Firm Size Employee/Self-
employed Interactions by Formal and Informal Status 
 
  Log Weekly Wage 
 





Fs2-5 × self-employed formal  0.325 (24.01)** 
Fs6-10 × self-employed formal  0.665 (13.35)** 
Fs11-15 × self-employed formal  0.675 (6.18)** 
Fs16-50 × self-employed formal  1.026 (6.75)** 
Fs>50 × self-employed formal  1.456 (5.70)** 
Fs2-5 × self-employed informal  0.245 (46.07)** 
Fs6-10 × self-employed informal  0.609 (30.50)** 
Fs11-15 × self-employed informal  0.692 (17.46)** 
Fs16-50 × self-employed informal  0.937 (15.66)** 
Fs>50 × self-employed informal  1.355 (7.34)** 
Fs2-5 × employed formal  0.003 (0.54) 
Fs6-10 × employed formal  0.062 (11.30)** 
Fs11-15 × employed formal  0.073 (11.86)** 
Fs16-50 × employed formal  0.097 (20.07)** 
Fs>50 × employed formal  0.118 (25.07)** 
Fs2-5 × employed informal  -0.162 (39.89)** 
Fs6-10 × employed informal  -0.017 (3.08)** 
Fs11-15 × employed informal  0.018 (2.31)* 
Fs16-50 × employed informal  0.038 (5.76)** 
Fs>50 × employed informal  0.056 (5.90)** 
    
Observations 344,427   
R-squared 0.26   
    
 
Notes: (i) Robust Standard errors are clustered by individuals; (ii) ** and * indicate 1% and 5 
% significance levels, respectively; (iii) Controls for sample wave, years education, years 
education squared, age, age squared, two marital status and one digit industry and occupation 
dummies and an indicator for town size are also included.  (iv)The excluded categories are the 
sample wave dummy for quarter two 2005, marital status is single, occupation is Professional 
and Technical, industry is Mining, town size is greater than 100,000 and the Fs1 × self-
employed informal interaction dummy. 44 
 















Λ  0.207  π2 33.77 
Σ  2  1 w   1.153 
P0  1  w  6.105 
P1  2  F
*  0.152 
P2  10  1 () Fw   0.250 
L0  6  u0  0.581 
L1  3.5  u1  0.649 
L2  0.5  s1  0.047 
S  0.4    
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25 A Stata file simulating the model and generating Figure 1 is available from the authors on request. UCD CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH – RECENT WORKING PAPERS  
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